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TRAHAN V. KINGREY: AN ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA’S 
RELOCATION STATUTE 
John H. Leech, Jr.* 
I. BACKGROUND 
Trahan v. Kingrey1 involves the question of relocation of the 
minor child, Devon, of Douglas Anthony Trahan and Elizabeth 
Donald Kingrey Romero. Devon was born on January 3, 2005 in 
Lafayette, Louisiana. Devon’s mother, Elizabeth Kingrey, was 
unmarried at the time of Devon’s birth and paternity was in 
question until DNA testing confirmed that Douglas Trahan was 
Devon’s biological father.2 After confirmation by DNA testing, 
Trahan fully accepted the obligations and responsibilities of 
parenthood.3 Two months after Devon’s birth, Trahan and Kingrey 
entered into a consent judgment which stated that they were to 
share equal joint custody of Devon on a one-week rotating basis.4 
Kingrey was designated as the domiciliary parent.5 
Kingrey subsequently married Timothy Romero on July 21, 
2005, who was her husband during the proceedings surrounding 
this case.6 Romero’s employer, The Wood Group, was in the 
process of shutting down its facilities in Louisiana.7 Romero was 
offered a promotion to stay with The Wood Group, but that 
promotion required his relocation to West Virginia.8 Rather than 
filing a “Notice of Relocation,” as required by Louisiana Revised 
 *  J.D. Candidate, LSU Law Center (2014). The author would like to 
provide a special thanks to Professor Elizabeth R. Carter for her assistance and 
guidance in the production of this case note. A special thanks also to Jennifer 
Lane and Alexandru-Daniel On of the JCLS. 
 1. Trahan v. Kingrey, 2011-1900 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/12), 98 So. 3d 347. 
 2. Id. at 349. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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Statutes 9:355, et seq., Kingrey filed a “Rule for Custody” on July 
15, 2009, stating that the move to West Virginia was required for 
her husband (Romero) to keep his employment.9 In her “Rule for 
Custody,” Kingrey alleged that the move to West Virginia would 
require a change to the shared custody arrangement.10 Trahan filed 
a “Rule for Change of Custody” in opposition to Kingrey’s request 
for relocation of Devon, alleging that it was in the child’s best 
interest that he be named domiciliary custodial parent rather than 
Kingrey.11 Trahan filed a subsequent pleading which alleged that 
Kingrey failed to follow the statutory requirements of Louisiana 
Revised Statutes 9:355 et seq. because she failed to give him notice 
of the proposed relocation and failed to provide the address, 
telephone number, date of move, proposed revised schedule of 
visitation, and a statement informing him that an objection to the 
proposed relocation should be filed within thirty days of the receipt 
of the notice.12 While awaiting judgment, Trahan and Kingrey 
entered into an interim consent judgment on September 4, 2009, 
wherein they agreed that they would share custody of Devon on a 
twenty-eight day rotating basis.13 
The trial court entered judgment granting the parties joint 
custody of Devon with Kingrey designated as the domiciliary 
parent, subject to visitation in favor of Trahan, pursuant to a Joint 
Custody Plan confected by the trial court.14 Devon was to reside 
with Kingrey in West Virginia.15 In written reasons for judgment, 
the court stated that, because all prior judgments issued in 
conjunction with this matter were by consent of the parties, and 
that there had never been a “considered decree” rendered in the 
case, “each party need only prove a change in circumstances 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 349-50. 
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materially affecting the welfare of Devon and that any proposed 
changes to the previous child custody decree are in the best interest 
of Devon.”16 The court also stated that it had considered the factors 
listed in Civil Code article 134 which are to be used to determine 
the best interest of a child for custody purposes and that the court 
came to its determination that Kingrey be the domiciliary custodial 
parent of Devon, subject to visitation with Trahan, based on those 
factors.17 
Trahan filed a motion for new trial with the trial court, which 
was denied.18 Appeal to the First Circuit subsequently followed.19 
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
A. Standard of Review 
The Court determined that this case was to be reviewed de 
novo. The Court proceeded with its determination that the trial 
court ruling should be reviewed de novo by quoting from Evans v. 
Lungrin:20 “where one of more trial court legal errors interdict the 
fact-finding process, the appellate court should then make its own 
independent de novo review of the record.”21 The legal error the 
appellate court identified was the failure of the trial court to 
analyze this case based on the relocation statutes (Louisiana 
Revised Statutes 9:355 et seq.).22 Instead, the trial court used the 
“best interest” factors for awarding custody (Louisiana Civil Code 
article 134).23 The trial court may have reasoned that Civil Code 
article 134 was the proper law to analyze this case due to the fact 
that Kingrey’s rule only requested a modification of custody rather 
 16. Id. at 350. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. 708 So. 2d 731, 735, citing Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So. 2d 1002, 1006 
(La. 1993). 
 21. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 351. 
 22. Id. at 350. 
 23. Id. 
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than a true relocation. The practical effect, however, of Kingrey’s 
rule for modification of custody was to create a relocation. The 
appellate court determined that the relocation factors should have 
been analyzed by the trial court, despite the improper filing by 
Kingrey.24 Thus, legal error was committed because the trial court 
applied the incorrect principles of law, and such errors were 
prejudicial, which caused deprivation of substantial rights to 
Trahan.25 
B. Burden of Proof 
The appellate court made note that the burden of proof in this 
case was different than what the trial court assumed.26 In 
relocation cases: 
The relocating parent has the burden of proof that the 
proposed relocation is made in good faith and is in the best 
interest of the child. In determining the child’s best interest, 
the court shall consider the benefits which the child will 
derive either directly or indirectly from an enhancement in 
the relocating parent’s general quality of life.27  
Therefore, the appellate court determined that Kingrey had to 
not only show that the relocation was done in good faith, but that 
such relocation was also in Devon’s best interest.28 
C. Good Faith 
The party seeking relocation—in this case Kingrey—bears the 
burden of showing that the relocation is made in good faith.29 The 
appellate court made the initial determination that Kingrey was in 
good faith when she first relocated with her husband, Timothy 
 24. Id. at 350-51. 
 25. Id. at 351. 
 26. Id. at 352. 
 27. Id. at 352, citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.13 (2010) (now La. Rev. 
Stat. 9:355.10, with language revised by Acts 2012, No. 627, §1). 
 28. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 352. 
 29. Id. 
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Romero.30 However, the facts changed after the initial move. 
Originally, Kingrey relocated to West Virginia because her 
husband was forced to take a job there in order to retain his 
employment with The Wood Group.31 At the time of trial, 
however, Romero no longer worked for The Wood Group.32 He 
had resigned his position in March of 2010, and accepted work 
with a competitor, Seaboard International, located in West 
Virginia.33 There was no evidence that Romero attempted to find 
comparable employment in Louisiana.34 Therefore, the Court was 
left questioning whether Kingrey remained in good faith.35  
D. Best Interest 
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.1436 lists twelve factors 
which the court shall consider when evaluating whether a proposed 
relocation is in the child’s best interests.37 The twelve factors are 
as follows: (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and 
duration of the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to 
relocate and with the non-relocating parent, siblings, and other 
significant persons in the child’s life; (2) The age, developmental 
stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will 
have on the child’s physical, educational, and emotional 
development, taking into consideration any special needs of the 
child; (3) The feasibility of preserving a good relationship between 
the non-relocating parent and the child through suitable visitation 
arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 349. 
 32. Id. at 352. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 352-53. 
 35. Id. 
 36. LA. REV. STAT. 9:355.14 is where the relocation factors are located as of 
August 1, 2012. This case references the relocation factors as LA. REV. STAT. 
9:355.12, which is where the relocation factors were located at the time of this 
case. This case note will refer to the relocation factors as LA. REV. STAT. 
9:355.14. 
 37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.14 (2012).  
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of the parties; (4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration 
the child’s age and maturity level; (5) Whether there is an 
established pattern of conduct of the parent seeking the relocation, 
either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the 
non-relocating party; (6) Whether the relocation of the child will 
enhance the general quality of life for both the custodial parent 
seeking the relocation and the child, including but not limited to 
financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity; (7) The 
reasons for each parent in seeking or opposing the relocation; (8) 
The current employment and economic circumstances of each 
parent and whether or not the proposed relocation is necessary to 
improve the circumstances of the parent seeking relocation of the 
child; (9) The extent to which the objecting parent has fulfilled his 
or her financial obligations to the parent seeking relocation, 
including child support, spousal support, and community property 
obligations; (10) The feasibility of a relocation by the objecting 
parent; (11) Any history of substance abuse or violence by either 
parent, including a consideration of the severity of such conduct 
and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation; and (12) 
Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child.38 
The court is required to consider these factors, as opposed to 
Louisiana Civil Code article 134 which lists factors that a court 
may consider when determining a child’s best interests in custody 
matters.39 
The Court weighed factors one, three, five, six, seven, eight, 
and ten in favor of Trahan.40  
The first factor in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 
concerns the nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of 
the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to relocate and 
with the non-relocating parent, siblings, and other significant 
 38. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 39. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 353. 
 40. Trahan, 98 So. 3d 347 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2012). 
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persons in the child’s life.41 The Court found that the sheer 
distance between Louisiana and West Virginia would inhibit the 
relationships between Devon and his numerous family members, 
especially that of his grandparents.42 The Court considered also 
that while Trahan had no relatives in the West Virginia area, 
Kingrey did have relatives in Louisiana in the form of her new 
adoptive parents in Lafayette.43 The presence of family in 
Louisiana provided Kingrey with more opportunities to visit 
Devon in Louisiana than it would Trahan in West Virginia.44  
The third factor concerns the feasibility of preserving a good 
relationship between the non-relocating parent and the child 
through suitable visitation arrangements, considering the logistics 
and financial circumstances of the parties.45 According to the 
visitation schedule the trial court devised, Trahan was responsible 
both for picking up Devon and returning him back to West 
Virginia, and was to incur all of the associated costs.46 The sheer 
distance in miles and travel time from West Virginia to Louisiana 
burdened Trahan to the point that the Court believed that even if 
such travel was financially feasible, it would greatly decrease both 
the frequency and the amount of time that Devon would be able to 
see his father, his paternal grandparents, and other family.47 
The fifth factor concerns whether there is an established pattern 
of conduct of the parent seeking relocation, either to promote or 
thwart the relationship of the child and the non-relocating party.48 
The Court noted that Kingrey, in the past, had refused to disclose 
Devon’s daycare/school names and locations to Trahan.49 Kingrey 
also would not put Trahan as an emergency contact for Devon’s 
 41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 42. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 355. 
 43. Id. at 355-56. 
 44. Id. at 356. 
 45. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 46. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357. 
 47. Id. 
 48. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 49. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357. 
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schools and instead placed her husband, Romero, as an emergency 
contact.50 The Court also took note of Kingrey’s hostility toward 
Trahan and his parents during her testimony, and it stated that there 
were concerns that she would attempt to thwart Trahan’s 
relationship with Devon.51  
The sixth factor of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 
considers whether the relocation of the child will enhance the 
general quality of life for both the custodial parent seeking the 
relocation and the child, including, but not limited to, financial or 
emotional benefit or educational opportunity.52 Because Kingrey is 
the parent who relocated, she carried the burden of proof to show 
that there was a benefit to the child, Devon, in this move.53 Both 
housing locations were suitable for Devon.54 The schools available 
to Devon in West Virginia and in Houma were seen as equal in the 
Court’s eyes.55 There was an assumption that the move to West 
Virginia resulted in an increase in salary for Romero, but the Court 
noted that there was nothing in the record indicating what he was 
making in Louisiana and, therefore, there could not be a 
calculation of any salary increase.56 Kingrey did not claim that she 
was unable to obtain any employment while in Louisiana.57 Given 
this information, the Court determined that Kingrey did not meet 
her burden of proving that the move to West Virginia enhanced 
Devon’s general quality of life and considered this factor to weight 
against allowing relocation.58 
Factor seven of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 considers 
the reasons for each parent in seeking or opposing the relocation.59 
The Court stated that Kingrey’s request to relocate originally was 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.at 358. 
 52. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 53. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 358. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 359. 
 59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
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in good faith, because it was due to the fact that her husband, 
Romero, either had to make the move to West Virginia or lose his 
job with his company, which was closing its business in 
Louisiana.60 However, that good faith was in question due to the 
fact that Romero subsequently accepted another job in West 
Virginia with another company and there was nothing to indicate 
that he attempted to find employment in Louisiana.61  
Factor eight considers the current employment and economic 
circumstances of each parent and whether or not the proposed 
relocation is necessary to improve the circumstances of the parent 
seeking relocation of the child.62 Originally, the move to West 
Virginia was due to the fact that the company that Romero worked 
for63 was closing its offices in Louisiana and told him that, in order 
to keep his position with the company, he would need to transfer to 
West Virginia.64 Kingrey, herself, did not need to make the move 
for her own employment.65 Therefore, the Court determined that 
Kingrey had failed in meeting her burden of proving that the 
relocation was necessary to improve her circumstances.66 
The tenth factor requires the court to consider the feasibility of 
a relocation by the objecting parent.67 The Court speculated that 
Trahan, who is a registered nurse, could likely obtain employment 
in West Virginia.68 However, the Court noted that Trahan also did 
not wish to leave his family69 behind to move to West Virginia.70 
 60. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 359. 
 61. Id.  
 62. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 63. The Wood Group. 
 64. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 349. 
 65. Id. at 359. It is important to remember that Romero had also ceased 
working for The Wood Group and there was no evidence provided that he had 
attempted to find employment in Louisiana before accepting another position in 
West Virginia. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 68. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360. 
 69. Consisting of approximately ninety relatives in or around Houma. 
 70. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360. 
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The Court found that factors two, four, nine, eleven, and twelve 
weighed in favor of neither party.71 
The second factor considers the age, developmental stage, 
needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on 
the child’s physical, educational, and emotional development, 
taking into consideration any special needs of the child.72 The 
Court determined that, as to Devon’s health and educational 
concerns, there was no evidence that either West Virginia or 
Louisiana was more beneficial than the other.73  
The fourth factor of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 is the 
child’s preference, taking into consideration the child’s age and 
maturity level.74 Because of Devon’s young age and the fact that 
both parents seem to have a good relationship with Devon, the 
Court determined that this factor did not weigh in favor or either 
Trahan or Kingrey.75 
Factor nine evaluates the extent to which the objecting parent 
has fulfilled his or her financial obligations to the parent seeking 
relocation, including child support, spousal support, and 
community property obligations.76 The Court noted that Trahan 
had always timely paid his child support obligations and there was 
no judgment or holding that Trahan had ever been in contempt for 
failing to make child support payments.77 
Factor eleven considers any history of substance abuse or 
violence by either parent, including a consideration of the severity 
of such conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at 
rehabilitation.78 The parties in this case, in the past, had abused 
drugs, and both alleged past instances of violence by the other.79 
 71. Id. at 347. 
 72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 73. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 356. 
 74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 75. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357. 
 76. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 77. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360. 
 78. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 79. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360. 
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The Court also noted that since Devon’s birth, there were no 
allegations of either drug abuse or violence by either party.80 The 
past custody agreement in which the parties split time with Devon 
evenly indicated that Kingrey did not consider Trahan to be a 
threat to Devon.81 Therefore, the Court found that that factor did 
not weigh in favor or either party.82 
The final factor, factor twelve, is a catch-all provision requiring 
the court to evaluate any other factors affecting the best interest of 
the child.83 The Court here found no other factors affecting the best 
interest of the child that had not already been covered.84 
The Court found none of the twelve factors in Louisiana 
Revised Statutes 9:355.14 to weigh in favor of Kingrey.85 
E. Other Suggestive Factors 
Louisiana Civil Code article 134 provides twelve factors that 
are used in determining the custody of a child and were suggestive 
in this relocation case.86 The Court considered most of what is 
provided for in Louisiana Civil Code article 134 by looking at the 
mandatory factors in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14, but the 
Court evaluated some of the factors in article 134 that were not 
explicitly covered.87 
Factor 1 of Civil Code article 134 requires a court in a custody 
proceeding to consider “the love, affection, and other emotional 
ties between each party and the child.”88 Factor 2 of Civil Code 
article 134 requires a court in a custody proceeding to consider 
“the capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, 
affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012). 
 84. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360. 
 85. Id at 347. 
 86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 134. 
 87. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 361. 
 88. LA. CIV. CODE art. 134. 
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rearing of the child.”89 Factor 3 requires a court to consider “the 
capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with 
food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.”90 The 
Court compared the availability of each party for the care of Devon 
and found that both parties were available to care for Devon, even 
though both parties required the aid of others in their households 
(Kingrey required help from Romero, and Trahan required the help 
of his parents, with whom he lived).91  
Factor 4 of Civil Code article 134 requires a court in a custody 
proceeding to consider “the length of time the child has lived in a 
stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining 
continuity of that environment. Factor 5 requires a court to 
consider “the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or 
proposed custodial home or homes.”92 The Court noted that 
Kingrey was born in Seoul, South Korea, and subsequently moved 
to California when she was adopted.93 She then moved with her 
adoptive family to Louisiana and lived in Morgan City, Lafayette, 
Broussard, Youngsville, and Houma.94 She then moved to West 
Virginia with her husband, Romero, as part of his relocation for 
work.95 Trahan was born, raised, and still lived in Houma.96 Devon 
was also born in Louisiana (Lafayette) and had spent half of his 
life either in Lafayette or Houma, up until the time his mother 
moved to West Virginia, relocating with her prior to this case.97 
The Court noted that Devon had a stable and supportive family 
structure in Louisiana and was of the opinion that it would be 
desirable to maintain that environment.98 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 361.  
 92. LA. CIV. CODE art. 134. 
 93. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 361. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 361-62. 
 97. Id. at 362. 
 98. Id. 
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F. Holding 
The Court concluded that Kingrey did not meet the burden of 
proof required of her as the relocating parent in a relocation case.99 
In addition, the Court found that Trahan was more likely than 
Kingrey to provide Devon with a “stable and permanent” residence 
in Louisiana.100 The Court further noted that both Trahan and 
Kingrey were capable of being available for Devon as far as 
custody was concerned.101 
The Court reversed the judgment of the 32nd Judicial District 
Court and rendered judgment in favor of Trahan as domiciliary 
parent of Devon.102 The Court determined that the parties should 
have joint custody of Devon and that visitation of Devon should be 
awarded in favor of Kingrey.103 The Court determined that the 
previous visitation schedule devised by the trial court for Trahan 
should stand, with Kingrey rather than Trahan as the visiting 
parent.104 
III. COMMENTARY 
The Court approached this decision very methodically and 
provided an excellent framework for the way in which Louisiana 
Revised Statutes 9:355.14 and Louisiana Civil Code article 134 
operate in conjunction with each other. The Court arrived at the 
correct decision by the letter of the law, and it seems the judgment 
is also equitable considering the facts and circumstances. 
Nonetheless, there are a few areas of this decision that present an 
opportunity to ask questions as to how the outcome could have 
been improved. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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To begin with, it should be noted again that Louisiana Revised 
Statutes 9:355.14 was revised in 2012, just after this case was 
heard.105 It was previously Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.12. 
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 comment (a) states that the 
revision changed the opening language of the statute to make it 
clear that a court does not need to make a factual finding on every 
factor.106 Here, this Court made a finding as to each of the twelve 
factors. Such analysis was not needed then, and certainly is clearly 
not needed now, per comment (a).107 Failure to analyze each factor 
does not constitute an error of law triggering a de novo review.108 
The court is free to give whatever weight it deems appropriate to 
any of the relocation factors.109 
Second, the visitation schedule that was assigned to Kingrey 
was exactly the same as that was originally assigned to Trahan by 
the trial court. The Court addresses that visitation plan while 
analyzing factor three,110 and expresses its concern that the sheer 
distance between Louisiana and West Virginia would have led to a 
substantial decrease in the amount of time Trahan could spend with 
Devon because of the financial constraints of such travel.111 The 
assignment of that same visitation plan to Kingrey does not remove 
the principal problem that the Court addressed. The Court merely 
shifted the burden that Trahan bore in the visitation plan to 
Kingrey. This action does not alleviate the problem created for the 
child’s relationship with his non-domiciliary parent. 
That being said, Factor 3 does concern the preservation of the 
relationship of the non-relocating parent with the child, and that 
“non-relocating” parent is not Kingrey. Therefore, the Court may 
 105. See supra note 36. 
 106. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14, cmt. (a) (2012). 
 107. See Poe v. Stone, 118 So. 3d 1227, 1229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2013), citing 
Gathen v. Gathen, 66 So. 3d 1, 9 (mentioning that a court is not required to 
expressly analyze each of the twelve relocation factors). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Poe, 118 So. 3d at 1229. 
 110. See supra Part II.D. 
 111. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357. 
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not be concerned with the financial constraints that traveling from 
West Virginia to Louisiana puts on Kingrey because she is the 
relocating parent. Moreover, it is certainly understandable that it is 
extremely difficult to devise a visitation schedule for two parents 
separated by roughly a thousand miles that is both feasible 
financially and fosters a good relationship between the non-
domiciliary parent and the child. 
The ultimate concern in cases such as this should be what is 
best for the child. It is the author’s opinion that the visitation 
schedule does not adequately help foster a good relationship 
between Kingrey and the child. It does seem equitable that 
Kingrey, as the relocating parent (taking into account also that 
living in West Virginia is no longer required for Kingrey and 
Romero), should incur the cost of travel for visitation. Kingrey is 
only granted thirty-five days in the summer and, not including the 
holiday rotation, thirty hours per month. The thirty hours per 
month seems profoundly low. While devising a visitation schedule 
that is fair and does not put the child in strenuous situations is 
difficult, in these kinds of predicaments more could probably be 
done. Even just providing an additional weekend per month in 
which Kingrey could visit Devon if she were to travel to Louisiana 
rather than have Devon travel to West Virginia might suffice. 
Understandably, Kingrey may not have the ability to finance her or 
Devon’s traveling from Louisiana to West Virginia, or vice versa, 
but the option to do so should be there. Thirty hours per month, 
which includes travel time, is just not enough to maintain a healthy 
relationship between a parent and a child.  
Third, Kingrey has a nuclear family structure that seemed to be 
overlooked. Kingrey is married to Romero and Kingrey has two 
other children, Jade and Noah, who visit during the summer and 
holidays (the same time as Devon), and Romero has two children 
that live in Lafayette.112 Therefore, through his mother’s side of 
 112. Id. at 355. 
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the family, Devon has two half-brothers, a step-brother and a step-
sister. While it is a very scattered family unit, the presence of a 
married couple running a household and the connection with 
siblings is valuable for a young child and seemed to be 
overlooked.113 Meanwhile, Trahan is not married, lives with his 
parents, and has no other children (albeit he has a rather large 
extended family).114 This could have been a circumstance that 
helped Kingrey’s case, had it been considered in either Factor 1 or 
Factor 12 of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14, or even in 
Factor 5 of Louisiana Civil Code article 134. Perhaps, however, 
the Court felt that preserving and cultivating Devon’s relationships 
with his paternal extended family outweighed the need to do so 
with his siblings.115 
Even had the Court addressed these two concerns, undoubtedly 
the outcome would have been the same. The only change that may 
have been warranted is minor tweaking to the visitation schedule in 
order to better foster Devon’s relationship with his mother as long 
as she continues to reside at such a distance from Devon.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this author’s opinion Trahan should have been named the 
domiciliary parent, as the Court decided. However, the visitation 
schedule is far too inadequate for the minor child. A mere thirty-
five days in the summer, rotating holidays, and a scant thirty hours 
per month, which includes travel time for the child, is simply not 
sufficient to foster a healthy relationship between Devon and his 
mother. 
 113. See Cucchiara v. Cucchiara, 543 So. 2d 638, 640 (La. App. 1st Cir. 
1989) (evaluating custody and considering the fact that the child would live in a 
nuclear family by residing with his mother).  
 114. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 355. 
 115. See Franklin v. Franklin, 763 So. 2d 759, 764 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2000) 
(considerating the child’s relationship with his siblings and also other significant 
persons in the child’s life in evaluating custody). 
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It seems as if the aim of the Court was simply to hand back to 
Kingrey that which had been handed to Trahan by the trial court. 
The Court even made reference to the fact that the visitation plan 
the trial court gave to Trahan was inadequate to foster a 
relationship between Devon and Trahan.116 While it seems that 
Kingrey may well have been trying to use the relocation, after her 
husband no longer needed to reside in West Virginia for work, to 
remove Trahan from Devon’s life as much as possible (and the 
court points out the fact that she had attempted to do so in the 
past117) retaliation for such acts should not be the aim of a 
visitation schedule. The main concern is, and always should be, the 
child’s best interests. The author is of the opinion that, whenever 
possible, and in the best interests of the child, having both parents’ 
influence in a child’s life is better than having just one or the other, 
or a limited amount of one or the other. It does not seem that a full 
effort was put into devising a visitation schedule here that would 
be best for the child. 
The fact that Kingrey is the relocating parent and that she (and 
perhaps her husband) no longer has any good reason to remain in 
West Virginia should be taken into consideration. But that 
consideration should only be in regard to which parent becomes 
the domiciliary parent and who bears the costs of transportation, 
not as to how the visitation schedule breaks down.  
The rigors of long distance travel on a young child must also be 
considered. And perhaps this is why the Court stuck with the trial 
court’s visitation schedule. For a young child, traveling from 
Louisiana to West Virginia once every month can be extremely 
stressful. Therefore, making the child travel every other weekend 
to West Virginia would not be in the best interests of the child. But 
visitation time with his mother is certainly in Devon’s best interest. 
For that reason, it is the author’s opinion that an equitable solution 
would have been to simply add to the visitation schedule that 
 116. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357. 
 117. Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14, Factor 5 (2012). 
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Kingrey could also travel to Louisiana herself once per month, on a 
weekend, and have an additional thirty hours of visitation with 
Devon, with all costs to be incurred by her. While, financially, she 
may not be able to afford such travel on a consistent basis, at least 
the option would have been afforded her, and that would certainly 
serve the best interests of Devon. While Kingrey may have been 
conspiring the remove Trahan from Devon’s life, there was no 
mention by the Court that Kingrey was an unfit mother and, thus, 
there is no reason to deprive Devon of the influence, guidance, and 
relationship with his mother any more than necessary to make this 
custody plan work.  
Besides the slight tweaking of the visitation plan, the author is 
of the opinion that this case is a superb example of the way in 
which the relocation factors (in Louisiana Revised Statutes 
9:355.14) and the best interests factors (in Louisiana Civil Code 
article 134) operate in conjunction with one another. The Court 
does an excellent job of breaking down the case by each particular 
issue and analyzing each in a very methodical manner. Moreover, 
it serves as a stark reminder to attorneys that if the proper 
procedure is not followed in relocation scenarios, the results can be 
devastating for the client. 
 
 
